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ANSLEY J. COALE
OFFICE OF POPULATION RESEARCH, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
THIS conference was planned to, discuss the mutual influences in indus-
trially advanced countries between changes in national population and
changes in national economies. The conference was limited primarily..to.
the causes and effects of variations in fertility and mortality, which are
the principal determinants of changes in national populations. Questions.
of local population changes, often dominantly influenced by migration,
were deliberately omitted.So were the causes and consequences of
population change in underdeveloped economies. It was not the view, of
the planning committee that these topics were any less important:.than
those we chose to emphasize: rather it was our.view, that. demographic-.
economic relations on a national level in industrially advanced countries
constitute, more than adequate scope for one .conference.The ensuing
proceedings indicate.that whatever weaknesses it had,. the conference did
not suffer from too narrow a focus.
The proceedings. make accessible in a single volume a description of
what demographers and economists think about economic influences .on
fertility and mortality, and about the influences of demographic factors
on important economic variables. The papers are of first-rate quality
and the discussion was lively and acute. The exchange of views between
experts from two disciplines on something of mutual interest was, I
believe, stimulating, to both. groups and it is to be hoped that the pro..
ceedings will have an interest as well for those who were not present.
When nearly twenty scholars are asked to write papers (each. on a
subject in which he has a special interest), the natural result is a somewhat
diverse collection, each paper' more easily understood and usually more
immediately interesting to those who share the author's specialty. So it
is with these papers,. There are few readers indeed who would be equally
at home with the technical demography 'in Norman B. Ryder's paper,
the social-psychological survey material covered by David Goldberg, the
theory of consumers' behavior in Gary Becker's paper, the statistics used
by Richard and Nancy Ruggles, and the econometrics employed by Guy
Orcutt and Alice M. Rivlin.
In other words, the proceedings do not and could not provide an
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integrated account of demographic-economic relations. In this situation
I felt that the most useful introduction would be one devoted to a short
statement of the theme of the conference to provide a background against
which more highly specialized papers could be read. The informal essay
that forms the 'rest of this introduction attempts to describe what the
conference was about, without, however, trying to summarize the
of the participants.
Just as in the conference, there is more emphasis in this introduction
on variations in fertility than in mortality.Fertility is emphasized
because only industrially advanced countries are considered. Among
such countries mortality differences are relatively slight.Moreover,
mortality changes in the next decades are not likely to be strongly influ-
enced by economic forces, nor is it probable that these changes will have
major economic consequences.Expectation of life at birth varies only
from sixty-four to seyenty-three years among the industrialized
including under this term the European countries (except Iberia and the
Balkans), Oceania, America north of the Rio Grande, Japan, and the
Soviet Union. Also mortality is declining most sharply in the countries
with the lowest life expectancy, so that differences are rapidly diminishing.
In the countries with the lowest mortality there is little room for further
declines in death rates except at the older ages. Unless on the one hand
we are victims of a nuclear war or, on the other, the beneficiaries of a
major break-through in the treatment of degenerative diseases, we can
look forward to rather gradual further increases in life expectancy. These
increases will not affect population growth nearly so profoundly as the
variations we can expect in fertility. Nor will mortality improvements
produce nearly such pronounced changes in age distribution as those
already "built in" by past variations in fertility, or those to be expected
in response to future fertility changes.
Fertility, on the other hand, has recently followed diverse courses in
industrialized countries, and has a much wider current range than
mortality. Gross reproduction rates vary from I .03 in West Germany to
1.88inCanada. The substitution of a gross reproduction rate of 1.88 for
one of 1.03 would contribute an additional annual natural increase of
2.0 per cent to the rate of growth if mortality risks were unchanged. On
the pther hand, the range of mortality in industrially advanced countries
—from a life expectancy of about sixty-four in the Soviet Union to one
of about seventy-three in Norway—would yield rates of annual increase
differing by only about 0.3 per cent, if fertility rates were the same in
both instances.
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Economic Influences on Fertility
Until the 1940's many demographers believed it possible to describe a
characteristic course of fertility that one could expect in any area under-
going industrialization.This course was downward from the high
fertility levels typical of pre-industrial agrarian economies to levels that
they believed would be (without state intervention) even below the low
rates found in western Europe in the 1930'S.
Indeed until the 1930's every area that had reached an advanced stage
of industrialization had experienced a prolonged and essentially unbroken
decline in fertility. In the countries of northern and western Europe (and
the overseas areas peopled by their emigrants) the decline had lasted at
least forty years, and in some instances more than a century. Moreover,
nearly universal patterns of differential fertility could be interpreted as
evidence that the small-family custom had not yet completed its diffusion.
Hence the slight revival of fertility in the late 1930's and early 1940's
was viewed as merely a transitory interruption of the, unfinished decline
in response to economic recovery.
The classic pattern of differentials was a negative association between
socio-economic status and fertility.Fertility tended to be lower among
urban than rural families, among the educated than among the un-
educated, among high income families than among low, and so forth.
These differentials were attributed to a "cultural lag" in the acceptance
of small families as desirable and in the mastery of the means to attain
them. It was expected that the ultimate association of fertility to income
would be positive, but that this correlation would arise when low-income
families had accepted the restriction of births and had decided that they
could afford only very small numbers of children. In fact a widely cited
positive association between income and fertility existed in Stockholm in
the 1930's, but Stockholm fertility was about the lowest in the world—
at only some 40 per cent of replacement.
After more than twenty years of rising fertility in the United States it
is clear enough that the revival 'in the latei 930's was anything but a
temporary quirk. However, the interpretation of the baby boom as the
natural consequence of prolonged prosperity is hardly more tenable than
the earlier interpretation of the reversal in the 1930's as momentary.
The next earlier period of notable prosperity in the United States—the
I 920's—was a period of sharply falling fertility. In fact, as Dudley Kirk
points out, the depressed 1930's produced more births by far than one
would expect on the basis of an extrapolation of the trend of the
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prosperous 1920's. The observed high correlation between economic
fluctuations and fluctuations in births is an association between devia-
tions from trends. A prophet fully aware of this correlation and gifted
with perfect foresight of the' economic future would not have predicted
in 1940 eighteen years of bumper birth crops.
Another basis for doubting any simple explanation of the postwar baby
boom as the result of postwar prosperity is the variety of courses followed
by fertility since World War ii in industrialized countries. in countries
where fertility had fallen to low levels by the mid 1930's there was a
fairly general rise during the early years of World War II, and a nearly,
universal peak in 1946 or 1947 at a level much above the 1930's.1 After
the postwar spurt, however, trends in these countries have been quite
varied.Following a brief decline during 1948—1950, fertility in the
United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand rose rather steeply
to levels that in 1956—1958 were well above the immediate pàstwar peak.
Fertility in Norway in the mid 1950'S was slightly above the level just
after the war, while in the remaining countries of northwestern Europe
the trend since 1947—1948 has been generally level or moderately declin-
ing. In no instance has there been a decline to the prewar levels. These
countries have shared in the general prosperity since the war. But while
immediately after the war the increase, in fertility experienced, for
example, by Sweden New Zealand was similar—48 per cent above
1935—1939 in New Zealand, and 40 per cent in Sweden—continued
postwar prosperity has been accompanied by fertility in New Zealand
7 per cent higher in 1956 than in 1945—1949, and in Swedén.io per cent
lower.2
At the same time countries with relatively high fertility in the 1930's
(Russia, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and countries of eastern Europe) generally
experienced continuing declines during and War II. Indeed,
almost all of these countries now have lower fertility than the United
States. Japan, after a brief postwar revival, has had an extraordinary
decline, so that in 1957 Japanese fertility (as measured by the gross
reproduction .rate) was among the two or three lowest in the world. 'Yet
many of these countries—for example, Italy and Japan—have enjoyed
relative prosperity in many of the postwar years.
If depression and recovery do not explain the fertility reversal in the
i 93o's and the sustained rise since, how can we account for them? The
West Germany wasanexception.
2SeeFrank Lorimer's discussion for hypotheses about possible special factors affecting
fertility in the English-speaking non-European countries. . .
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explanation is necessarily noneconomic in part. A reduction in average
age at marriage, an increase in the proportion ever married, and a new
record lowchildlessness were developments not previously strongly
associated either with national• prosperity or with individual affluence;
yet they account for much of the baby boom.
A hypothesis that would further diminish the importance of prosperity
in accounting for the recent course of fertility was suggested during the
conference discussion. This hypothesis is that when the custom of family
limitation is in the later stages of its spread through a population, the
fertility of that population is temporarily depressed below any tenable
long-term level. There are two bases for the hypothesis. One is that
period fertility will tend to fall below an equilibrium level because birth
restriction by different cohorts will be bunched in the same period. The
other basis is that a few cohorts at the peak of the fashion of birth control
will carry the practice further. than later cohorts who, view family
limitation more as a matter of course.
Period fertility would fall temporarily below an equilibrium level
(defined as equal to the average fertility of cohorts long after family
limitation has completed its spread) because many couples just taking up
contraception might already have had all the children they wanted. A
couple of this sort might have had, for example, three children when the
wife is twenty-seven and, having discovered birth control, decided to
have no more. Had they practiced contraception from marriage the third
birth would have occurred, say, when the wife was thirty. Thus the
diffusion of contraception through the .populationcould mean that
members of a series of marriage cohorts would simultaneously reduce
fertility to an unusual degree.3
But the fertility of the. marriage cohorts whose childbearing occurs. at
the of the spread: of contraceptive practice also tends to fall
below, the fertility of later cohorts. When birth control is still a new
idea, keeping up with the Joneses means having fewer children. But
when voluntary control of family size has become nearly universal,
infertility no longer conveys any invidious distinction.In fact a large
family. may even take on a Veblenian value as a form of conspicuous
expenditure.
The hypothesis thatperiod fertility tends to swing below its equilibrium
level suggests that there would have been a fertility minimum followed
In fact, as Norman Ryder shows, if the spread of contraception results in a rising
average age of childbearing and an increasing dispersion about the average age, period
fertility is necessarily depressed relative' to the fertility of cohorts then at the central ages
of childbearing.
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by a revival in the 1930'S even if there had been no depression and no
subsequent boom. These economic events may have caused merely an
accentuation of a sequence that would have occurred anyway.If this
notion has validity, fertility in Japan should soon reach bottom, even
under favorable economic circumstances, and then recover somewhat, an
eventuality that seems the more likely in view of the drastic role played
by abortion in achieving the low current levels. This hypothesis is not
put forward with any real confidence, but merely as a possible alternative
to a view that overemphasizes economic factors.
Data on differential fertility, while too complex to. be summarized
here, can be described in brief as showing for recent years only a slight
relation between income and family size.In recent interview surveys
specifically designed to explore the factors affecting fertility, income is
found to be very weakly related to desired or expected family size, while
a similarly slight relationship is found in Current Population Survey data
between achieved fertility and income.4
While it can be confidently asserted that short-run economic fluctua-
tions have a fairly predictable impact on short-run fertility variations,
we can only guess what fertility would accompany an extended continu-
ation of prosperity on the one hand, or a prolonged depression on the
other.5
Economic Influences on Human Mortality
The effect of economic variables on risks of dying in the industrially
advanced countries is probably. weaker and less direct than effects on
fertility. From a very long-run point of view, of course, there has been
a fairly intimate causal association between increases of life expectancy
and industrialization.Mortality reduction has been the result of law
and order and regularity of food supply, but overwhelmingly the conse'
quence of purer water supplies, environmental sanitation, the gradual
development of vaccines and serums, and in recent years remarkable
progress in perfecting insecticides, chemotherapeutics, and antibiotics.
It is hard to imagine that these developments in medicine and public
health would have occurred without changes in industrial organization
and techniques. An examination of the periods of most rapid mortality
improvements in Europe or the United States makes it clear that the
proximate force at work was some innovation in medicine or .public
health, not a period of unusual prosperity or industrial progress. Thus
'SeeDavid Goldberg's and Clyde V. Kiser's papers.
See papers by Dudley Kirk and by Orcutt and Rivlin.
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mortality reduction was accelerated when large cities acquired better
water supplies in the nineteenth century, and when such recent scientific
advances as antibiàtics and insecticides were introduced.
Perhaps the most remarkable instances of mortality reduction largely
independent of economic change are to be observed in the low-income
areas of the world In these areas medical innovations are being
introduced from the industrialized parts of the world with startling effects
on death rates, both in areas that are developing economically and in
areas that are not. There may be some question about the permanence
of the gains in longevity achieved in areas unless profound
economic and social changes occur soon. But it seems probable that the
course of mortality in areas can be safely discussed without
reference to prospective variation in strictly economic forces.
Mortality, Fertility, and Population Change
Population growth equals net immigration plus the excess of births over
deaths. Many national populations no longer experience large changes.
from net migration, and growth depends very largely on the balance of
mortality and fertility.
The age structure of a population is an important determinant of
births and deaths. Reproduction is limited to a particular segment of the
life span, in industrialized cOuptries births occur mostly to women twenty
to forty, and mortality is increasingly concentrated in relatively advanced
ages.The death rate is about eleven per thousand in England and
Wales, where the life expectancy is seventy yeats, and only eight in Japan,
where the life expectancy is sixty-six. The cause of this apparent anomaly
is differences in the age distributions. Japan's population has a much
smaller fraction over age fifty.
The age distribution of a population is also of major direct economic
significance because age is a determinant of economic behavior.For
example, consumption patterns are very different at different ages, and
labor force participation is highly correlated with age.
The age structure .of a population that has been affected neither by
heavy recent gains or losses through migration nor by very large military
losses is almost wholly the result of the past history of its fertility. Con-
tinued high fertility produces a population with many children and with
numbers that rapidly diminish with age; continued low fertility produces
a population with relatively few children and with a high proportion of
the aged. A decline in fertility will yield a population that has few children
and a temporary "bulge" in early adult ages, while a rise in fertility
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produces many children and a temporary deficit in early adult ages.
These effects are illustrated by the United States age distributions of
and 1957. The 1940 age distribution shows the effect of the pre-
ceding prolonged fertility decline, with a scarcity of children and rela-
tively many persons in early adult ages. The 1957 age distribution has
a high proportion of young children, because of recent high fertility, a
conspicubus trough resulting from. the minimum fertility of the 1930's,
and a high proportion over fifty, reflecting the •high fertility before
1910.
Changes in mortality that have occurred to date have had very slight
effects on the age distribution. In brief, the United States age distribu-
tion is very similar to the one that would exist had current. mortality risks
always prevailed while fertility followed itsactual historic course.6
However, our population is much larger a.nd is growing faster than would
•be the case if mortality had failed to decline.
The interrelations in a closed population of growth, size, age distribu-
tion,fertility, and mortality can be describeda few. summary
statements.
i. Population size depends on the size at some previous date and the
interim rate of growth.
2. The rate of population growth depends on fertility, mortality, and
the age distribution. increases with fertility, arid decreases with
mortality. It also is increased by an age distribution with high proportions
in the ages of childbearing, and with low proportions in the ages of high
mortality.
3. The age distribution is almost wholly determined by the past course
of fertility.7
Population Change and Per Capita Output
In this very brief statement the sort of population changes brought by
high fertility will be contrasted with those brought by low fertility.8
Mortality will be neglected as a contributing variable for reasons already
given. I shall first discuss the effect of demographic variables on aggregate
6Foran explanation of this fact see Frank W. Notestein's paper, and the references
there cited.
However, future variations in mortality mayhavea substantial impact on the age
distribution if there is an unprecedented improvement in survivorship at advanced ages
with trivial improvement at young ages.
8Highfertility here means simply above low fertility, which in turn is taken as a gross
reproduction rate at least high enough to insure replacement or, to be more concrete,
high fertility means a level comparable to that now current in the United States or
Canada, and low fertility means a level like that in France, England or Scandinavia.
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demand. Subsequently it will be assumed that deficiencies in demand
can be ignored, and questions of the influence of population on the
aggregate production function will be discussed.
POPULATION AND EFFECTIVE DEMAND
The sort of population change produced by high fertility serves as a
stimulus to aggregate demand. High fertility, of course, promotes more
rapid growth than iow fertility.Fast growth implies higher and more
secure returns from producers' investment and a stronger tendency for
consumers to buy durable equipment such as homes and furniture. High
fertility also produces an age distribution with only a small proportion in
the ages of labor-force participation. If the population of I bor-force age
is used as the invariant element in comparing age structures, it is clear
that the labor force has more dependents to support if current and recent
fertility are high. More dependents per earner tend to raise the consump-
tion function at the expense of savings and exert an upward pressure on
government expenditures, especially for education.In short, higher
fertility raises the demand, ceteris paribus, for goods currently consumed,
for durable consumers' goods, for producers' goods, and puts upward
pressure on government expenditures.
A high fertility population in an industrialized country, where low
mortality can be assumed, thus has many children relative to its adult
population, and many persistent pressures toward higher expenditures—
pressures toward inflation and high levels of employment.
POPULATION AND PRODUCTIVITY
This section is a very short outline of how variations in fertility and
mortality affect output per capita in industrialized countries.Full
employment is assumed. The underlying concept employed is an aggre-
gate production function where total output depends on inputs of labor,
capital, and resources.
The principal analysis compares output per capita with low fertility
and with high. Consider first labor input in relation to the size of the
population. Low fertility tends, ceterisparibus, toyield a larger labor
force relative to total population, for two reasons: because low fertility
brings about an age distribution with a higher proportion in the ages of
usual labor-force participation, and because low fertility increases the
possibility of women's entering the labor force.
Next there is the question of the relation of labor inputs relative to
resources.If we assume for the moment that the supply of capital is
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equally favorable with high or low fertility, the relationship to resources
becomes essentially a question of economies of scale.High fertility
ultimately produces more workers, and the problem is whether economies
of scale in using resources tend to offset tendencies toward diminishing
returns.There is no clear-cut answer except in the long run.Life
expectancy having reached some seventy years, high fertility—even the
modest sort of high fertility characteristic of the United States—implies
quite rapid growth, to something like a billion persons in the United
States in a century, six billion in two centuries, and one person per square
foot in about seven hundred and fifty years.Ultimately, high fertility
produces a population that overwhelms any finite resources, and dimin-
ishing returns must sometime become more important than economies of
scale.But short-run predictions that larger populations would put a
disastrous strain on resources have repeatedly proved wrong. Apparently
there has been little rise in the cost of products (farm products
and minerals) relative to highly processed products. This fact does not
prove that economies of scale have offset diminishing returns.After all,
had population growth been less, raw materials might have become
cheaper relative to other products. Also, the technological effort required
to maintain the flow of useful resources at no higher relative cost might
have been used to achieve greater productivity in other parts of the
economy. But it nevertheless remains a tenable hypothesis that the real
costs of using resources are fairly constant over a wide range of population
size, and that high fertility would not on this account tend to produce
lower per capita output for many years in the industrialized countries.
Two further points must be noted on the question of population size.
Simon Kuznets emphasizes the crucial role of technical knowledge in
raising productivity and speculates that if geniuses constitute a fixed pro-
portion of the population, a larger population might contain more
geniuses and attain faster scientific and technical progress.It was stated
during the discussion of Kuznets' paper that because of the international
transmission of information his argument applies to the population of the
world rather than to a national population. Moreover, the extraordinary
bursts of intellectual output in classic Greece, in Renaissance Italy, in the
England of Elizabeth I, Bacon, and Newton, and in Budapest during the
1920's and 1930's bring into question the importance of numbers as such
as a source of intellectual progress.
The second further point about size is that whatever the elasticity of
resources as population grows there is one resource—living space—that
inevitably becomes scarce.Harold Barnett recently quoted a passage
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from John Stuart Mill, who more than a century ago stated with typical
eloquence the inevitable problem of space limitation
There is room in the world, no doubt, and even in old countries, for a great
increase in population, supposing the arts of life to go on improving, and capital
to increase. But even if innocuous, I confess I see very little reason for desiring
it....Itis not good for man to be kept perforce at all times in the presence of
his species. A world from which solitude is extirpated, is a very poor ideal.
Nor is there much satisfaction in contemplating the world with nothing left to the
spontaneous activity of nature; with every rood of land brought into cultivation,
which is capable of growing food for human beings; every flowery waste or natural
pasture ploughed up, all quadrupeds or birds which are not domesticated for
man's use exterminated as his rivals for food, every hedgerow or superfluous tree
rooted out, and scarcely a place left where a wild shrub or flower could grow with-
out being eradicated as a weed in the name of improved agriculture.
The final question about the effect of demographic variables on per
capita output relates to the availability of capital.High fertility, by
increasing the ultimate rate of growth of the labor force, increases the
need for current investment in order merely to keep output per woEker
constant.If the labor force grows by 3 per cent a year, an investment
of perhaps 9 per cent of annual output is needed merely to equip new
workers.In short, high fertility, by raising the rate of growth, greatly
increases the proportion of national income that must be devoted to
investment in order to achieve any specific rate of increase in per capita
output. But high fertility exerts an upward pressure on the proportion
of income devoted to consumption, and hence tends to depress the propor-
tion diverted to investment. The pressure for consumption is the result
of more dependents per earner.
High fertility leads to faster population growth and more dependents
per earner. Faster growth means, of course, greater numbers; and while
in the long run a constantly growing population swamps any finite re-
sources, the only certain effect in the near future is greater crowding.
But faster growth requires more investment, and the greater burden of
dependency that high fertility entails implies both dividing the output of
each producer with more consumers and diverting a smaller proportion
to investment. High fertility stimulates demand, but tends to reduce
productivity per capita.
The effects of mortality on productivity can be dismissed more sum-
marily. Additional reductions in mortality would add very little to the
growth of the population. Even the perpetual avoidance of all deaths
beginning in 1950 would have yielded a lower long-range growth rate
'John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy, Bk. 4, ch. 6.
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than continuing, the mortality risks then current, but adopting the
fertility rates of 1957. If there are future major reductions in the risks of
death, they must occur in what are now the later years of life and would
tend to increase the proportion of the population beyond the now custom-
ary ages of retirement. But it is probable that health and vigor as well
as life would be prolonged, and it is not certain that dependency burdens
would be increased in the same proportion as the change in the age
distribution.
When viewed in aggregate terms, the effects of demographic variables
on the economy form a paradox of sorts: the growth arising from high
fertility increases aggregate demand but reduces the full employment
capability of the economy to increase its output per head.
MORE DETAILED INTERRELATIONS
The synopsis just presented treats only uniform fertility trends (high
and low), distinguishes only very broad groups in the age distribution,
and treats output very nearly as if it were a homogeneous commodity. A
fuller analysis of population would consider such questions as the age
composition within the ages of labor force participation, the number of
persons annually passing the usual age of labor-force entry, and so forth.
A fuller economic analysis would note that demographic factors affect
the composition of output as well as helping determine its total value at
constant prices. The conference papers could touch only fragments of
these detailed issues, and this introduction ends without touching them
at all.
The participants in the conference are indebted to the Universities-
National Bureau Committee for Economic Research for sponsoring the
meeting, and to Princeton University• for making available the Social
Science Lounge of the Firestone Library.Serving on the planning
committee with the writer were Edgar M. Hoover, Richard Ruggles,
J. J. Spengler, Warren G. Robinson, Secretary, and Margaret MacDonald,
who succeeded Mr. Robinson.Irwin Friend of the University of
Pennsylvania organized the papers for the last session of the conference.
Cornelius J. Dwyer of the National Bureau of Economic Research did
an exceptional job in preparing the papers and comments for publication.
Not only was he an unusually skillful editor, who improved the quality
of the contributions whjle shortening them substantially, but because of
his technical competence as an economist he helped a number of the
authors in clarifying their arguments. H. Irving Forman of the National
Bureau prepared the charts.
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The Analysis of Population Change